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Abstract
Prejudices towards different groups are interrelated, but research has yet to find a way to promote tolerance towards
multiple outgroups. We devise, develop and implement a new cognitive intervention for achieving generalized tolerance
based on scientific studies of social categorization. In five laboratory experiments and one field study the intervention led to
a reduction of prejudice towards multiple outgroups (elderly, disabled, asylum seekers, HIV patients, gay men), and fostered
generalized tolerance and egalitarian beliefs. Importantly, these effects persisted outside the laboratory in a context marked
by a history of violent ethnic conflict, increasing trust and reconciliatory tendencies towards multiple ethnic groups in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. We discuss the implications of these findings for intervention strategies focused
on reducing conflict and promoting peaceful intergroup relations.
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Introduction
The spectre of prejudice can rapidly reverse the harmony of
intergroup relations, and escalate into full-scale conflict, war and
genocide. The Oxford English Dictionary (2011) defines prejudice
as: ‘‘a preconceived opinion that is not based on reason or actual experience’’.
In this article we devise, develop, and test a new approach to
reducing prejudice that targets this unreasoning, heuristic basis for
prejudice. Social cognitive research has shown that the roots of
prejudice are buried deep in a fundamental bias in the way people
process information. The intervention we propose does not
attempt to change the content of existing stereotypes, it changes
the way in which people think about outgroups. We argue that this
‘core cognition’ approach to reducing prejudice has great potential
because it addresses one of the biggest challenges facing
contemporary research on prejudice-reduction: How to promote
generalized tolerance towards multiple groups; that is, egalitarianism
in intergroup attitudes.
Achieving Generalized Tolerance
For decades, social scientists have been concerned with the
question how to reduce prejudice between social groups. Much
progress has been made, but the field faces an important
challenge: Techniques that reduce prejudice towards one group
do not readily transfer to other outgroups, or in other words,
promote generalized tolerance. Consider research arising from
Allport’s [1] contact hypothesis: The prejudice-reducing effects of
contact may be beneficial to the target outgroup (e.g., immigrants),
but do not routinely generalize to other outgroups (e.g., the
disabled). Although there is some recent evidence for so-called
secondary transfer effects, this transfer has been limited to groups
that share the same superordinate category (e.g., immigrants and
political refugees) [2]. Our aim was to develop a new intervention
designed specifically to foster generalized tolerance. In so doing, we
hope to provide a new type of cognitive intervention to fill the gap
between existing contact [3], [4], and multicultural [5], [6], [7],
[8], perspectives on prejudice reduction. Our approach is rooted
in scientific research on the categorical basis of person perception,
so this is where our treatise begins.
Multiple Social Categorization
Categorizing people into different groups, ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’, has
been the basis of intractable conflict across the world. The Troubles
between the Catholics and the Protestants in Northern Ireland, the
long drawn Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East, and the
ethnic cleansing between the Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims
on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia are but a few examples.
Research on multiple social categorization has explored what
happens when instead of this simple ‘‘us’’ vs. ‘‘them’’ criterion,
people are compelled to think in ways that emphasize multiple
affiliations [9], [10]. Recent research on multiple categorization
has shown that encouraging people to think of counter-stereotypic
categorizations is particularly effective at reducing prejudice [11],
[12]. Counter-stereotypic categorization describes when a person
does not fit in to existing categorical expectancies (e.g., a gay
priest, a male midwife). Consistent with underlying social cognitive
theory [13], when a person is described by mutually (stereotyp-
ically) inconsistent categories, perceivers cognitively ‘shift gear’ to
focus on individuating characteristics as a way of resolving the
inconsistency [14], [15]. Our contention is that this cognitive
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switching from heuristic to individuated thinking does not stop
with the target at hand, but has the potential to be a much more
powerful approach to prejudice-reduction than previously
thought. The hypothesized extended benefits of this heuristic
switching, under counter-stereotypic conditions, are derived from
research on the cognitive characteristics of mindsets.
Mindsets and Intergroup Conflict
Mindsets are content-free processing orientations that are often
linked to goals. For example, individuals can be motivated to
integrate or differentiate information, leading to assimilation and
contrast effects respectively [16]. Mindsets are also linked to
different stages of goal-pursuit [17], [18], [19], and have important
self-regulatory functions [20]. Mindsets impact judgments indepen-
dently of the context in which they were elicited, and it is precisely
for this reason that methods that tackle people’s core cognitions
may be more successful at reducing prejudice in real contexts of
conflict. One notable example is recent research carried out in the
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by Halperin and
colleagues [21] which aimed to change people’s beliefs about
outgroup malleability. In a cross-sectional field study of Israeli
Jews they first showed that believing groups were malleable led to
more positive attitudes, which in turn led to a greater willingness to
compromise with the Palestinians. Across three further experi-
ments Halperin and colleagues showed that inducing individuals
with beliefs about the malleable versus fixed nature of groups
encouraged more positive attitudes towards the outgroup, which
then led to greater willingness to compromise for peace. Notably,
these results emerged amongst diverse samples (i.e., Israeli Jews,
Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Palestinians in the West Bank)
attesting to the convergent validity of this technique to reduce
prejudice via modifying people’s beliefs. That the intervention did
not mention specific adversary groups during the induction stage,
speaks to the viability of developing interventions that tackle
people’s core cognition (i.e., the mindset they adopt when thinking
about outgroups) rather than the content of their specific
prejudices.
Speaking to the potential mechanisms through which mindsets
may affect social perception, Sassenberg and Moskowitz [22]
found that priming individuals with a creative mindset can inhibit
the automatic activation of stereotypes at an implicit level. In their
studies, participants who were primed to adopt a creative mindset
showed lowered automatic activation of stereotypes associated
with African Americans when compared to participants who were
primed to adopt a thoughtful mindset (Study 1), and also showed
decreased activation of stereotypes related to neutral non-social
stimuli (Study 2). These findings illustrate that mindsets can
promote changes to individuals’ core cognition when confronted
with information on outgroup members.
A Heuristic-Switching Mindset
We argue that the process of individuation, outlined by Fiske
and Neuberg’s [13] continuum model, and evident under
counter-stereotypic conditions, may be much more powerful
than previously thought. If conceptualized, and harnessed, as a
mindset manipulation, we argue that counter-stereotypes can
elicit a heuristic-switching mindset, which will result in a
temporary, cognitive shift away from heuristic thinking [23].
Such a mindset may be key to achieving generalized tolerance
because adopting such a mindset will promote the temporary
tendency to think of all groups not in heuristic, stereotypic terms,
but as individuals. Specifically, we hypothesize that being
compelled to think counter-stereotypically about others should
induce a thinking style characterized by the tendency to abandon
established routines (i.e., stereotyping), engage in generative
thought, and consider individuating attributes, regardless of the
specific target group at hand.
Our predictions derive from the Categorization-Processing-
Adaptation-Generalization model (CPAG) [23], which proposes
that experiencing diversity that confronts existing stereotypes
promotes a shift from heuristic modes of thinking, thereby
lessening people’s reliance on stereotypes in guiding evaluations
of groups. According to the CPAG model such a heuristic-
switching mindset will only ensue if people are motivated to
engage with the stereotype-disconfirming information, and have
the cognitive resources to resolve the inconsistency.
The Present Research
One aim of the present investigation was to test the notion,
derived from the CPAG model, that experiencing social diversity
that challenges people’s preconceptions can promote generalized
tolerance. In its focus on promoting cognitive flexibility this
proposition links with Sassenberg and Moskowitz’s [22] earlier
work; however, it goes much further to specify uniquely how
cognitively flexible responding can (a) be manifested in increased
tolerance evidenced across multiple outgroups and (b) can be
encouraged through the experience of counter-stereotypic cate-
gory combination. As such, our model provides a way of linking
research on the cognitive underpinnings of tolerance to research
on social categorization and social diversity, with corresponding
implications for multicultural policy and practice.
An important goal of the present research was also to examine,
for the first time, the consequences of resolving inconsistencies for
a generalized reduction in prejudice and increased egalitarianism.
This is important for at least two reasons. First, previous work on
cognitive flexibility mindsets did neither examine social judgments
(i.e., the application of stereotypes), nor the wider implications for
promoting tolerance and egalitarian attitudes. Secondly, and
perhaps most importantly, at the present there are no interven-
tions to tackle prejudicial perceptions towards multiple outgroups
that do not share the same superordinate category. This represents
a significant gap in our knowledge of prejudice reduction, which
the present research seeks to fill.
We devised a task that asked participants to generate either
five counter-stereotypic, or five stereotypic, social category
combinations (see Supporting Material S1 for a copy of the
cognitive task), see also [24]. Participants were free to generate
any social category combinations they could think of. Examples
of counter-stereotypic combinations generated by participants
include: overweight model, rich student, female firefighter, or male midwife.
Generation of stereotypic combinations was the appropriate
control because it constituted a task of equivalent load while
representing the default mode of stereotypic person perception
[13], [25], [26], [27]. We therefore hypothesized that generating
five counter-stereotypic category combinations would elicit
greater cognitive flexibility and engender generalized tolerance
toward a range of outgroups. To then establish whether the
benefits of a counter-stereotypic mindset extend beyond the
laboratory, we also conducted a field experiment in a context
marked by a history of ethnic conflict. All six experiments were
conducted in accordance with APA standards for the ethical
treatment of human participants, and gained the prior approval
by the Ethics Committee of the School of Psychology at the
University of Kent. Informed written consent was obtained from
all participants involved in these experiments. The six experi-
ments we conducted are reported below.
Tolerance by Surprise
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Experiments 1, 2, and 3: Cognitive Foundations
The first three experiments aimed to develop the new procedure
and test the underlying assumptions of our theoretical model.
Specifically, Experiment 1 tested whether generating surprising
category combinations activated generative thought and a
cognitive flexibility mindset as evidenced by a lowered need for
cognitive closure [28]. The need for cognitive closure reflects an
individual’s preference for a concrete solution as opposed to
enduring uncertainty and ambiguity. Need for closure is an
important concept for the present purposes because individuals
with a low need for closure are more inclined to deliberate and
seek out novel information [29], focus more on individuating
information as opposed to categorical information [30], and rely
less on immediate impressions and stereotypic knowledge [31],
[32].
Experiment 2 probed the consequences of this mindset for the
inhibition of stereotypic (i.e., dominant) associations using the
Stroop paradigm [33]. Performance on the Stroop test reflects
multiple underlying capacities, but an important component is the
ability to inhibit the processing of semantic content. The task also
requires individuals to adjust to different task demands. Thus, the
Stroop task was our preferred choice to provide an index of
people’s capacity to exhibit cognitive control and to respond to the
changing demands of their environment.
Experiment 3 employed a measure of lateral thinking [34] to
confirm that a counter-stereotypic mindset encourages flexible,
divergent thinking. Lateral thinking is the aptitude to use an
indirect and inventive approach when faced with the task of
solving problems. Thus, lateral thinking involves observing the
problem at hand from multiple, novel perspectives, discarding
traditional modes of thinking. Unlike Experiments 1 and 2,
Experiment 3 also employed a baseline condition in which
participants did not generate any social category combinations.
Method
Participants and design. In Experiment 1, fifty British
undergraduates (22 females, Mage = 20.96), in Experiment 2, sixty-
one British undergraduates (47 females, Mage = 18.97), and in
Experiment 3, fifty-four British undergraduates (43 females,
Mage = 20.53) were randomly assigned to a counter-stereotypic or
stereotypic priming condition. In Experiment 3, we added a
second control condition in which participants did not generate
any category combinations. Unless stated otherwise, course credits
were offered in return for participation in all experiments.
Procedure and materials. Upon arrival participants were
asked to write down five counter-stereotypic, or five stereotypic
social category combinations. In Experiment 3, a third group of
participants did not complete this step. In all experiments,
manipulation checks confirmed that participants primed with
counter-stereotypicality rated the category combinations they
generated as more surprising and less similar than the participants
primed with stereotypicality (all ps,.01). In Experiment 1,
participants then completed the Need for Cognitive Closure – Lexical
scale (NFCC-L) [28]. It required participants to choose one of two
possible words to complete a sentence, i.e., ‘‘She preferred to
travel to [familiar, unfamiliar] places’’ (coded: 0-ambiguous, 1-
concrete) [a= .69, M= .50, SD= .18]. In Experiment 2, participants
completed a standard computerized Stroop task after the priming
task [33]. In Experiment 3, participants were asked to solve ten
puzzles that required lateral thinking (e.g., Question: ‘‘A police
officer saw a truck driver clearly going the wrong way down a one-
way street, but did not try to stop him. Why not?’’; Answer:
Because the truck driver was walking). Answers were scored for
accuracy on a dichotomous scale (0 = incorrect, 1 = correct). A
composite score was derived by summing up all correct responses
whilst taking into account participants’ prior familiarity with the
puzzles.
Results and Discussion
In Experiment 1, an independent samples t-test confirmed that
participants primed with a counter-stereotypic mindset displayed a
lower need for cognitive closure than those primed with
stereotypicality, t(48) = 2.05, p= .046, d = 0.59 (Ms= .46 vs..56).
These results provide a first indication that priming a counter-
stereotypic mindset is conducive to generative thought and a move
away from heuristic forms of thinking - a basis for greater cognitive
flexibility [35]. Because a low need for cognitive closure is
associated with lowered outgroup derogation [36], these findings
also hint at the possibility that priming a counter-stereotypic
mindset may lead to decreases in prejudice.
Standard pre-analysis treatment of response times in the Stroop
task in Experiment 2 were performed, resulting in the removal of
four outliers with response times exceeding two and a half
standard deviations the sample average. An independent samples
t-test then showed that generating counter-stereotypic category
combinations reduced Stroop interference (Ms= 69 ms vs.
100 ms), t(55) = 1.89, p= .06, d = 0.51. This further indicates a
switch away from heuristic thinking under counter-stereotypic
conditions, and the enhanced tendency to engage executive
functions such as inhibition of dominant associations (i.e.,
stereotypes).
In Experiment 3, a one-way ANOVA demonstrated that there
were significant differences between the three experimental
conditions, F(2, 53) = 4.50, p= .016, g2 = 0.15. Tukey post-hoc
comparisons revealed that participants primed with counter-
stereotypicality (M= 3.50) solved significantly more lateral think-
ing puzzles compared to participants primed with stereotypicality
(M= 2.29), p= .038; and also compared to participants who did
not generate any category combination prior to the puzzles
(M= 2.26), p= .027. Comparisons between the baseline and
stereotypic condition were not significant, p= .998. These results
demonstrate that thinking of counter-stereotypic exemplars can
lead to a more indirect and creative approach when solving
problems. Moreover, this study further supports the contention
that it is priming counter-stereotypic thinking, not stereotypic
thinking, that leads to changes in peoples’ core cognitive style.
Experiment 4: Reducing Prejudice and Promoting
Tolerance
The main aim of Experiment 4 was to probe the consequences
of a counter-stereotypic mindset for promoting tolerance and
reducing prejudice towards multiple outgroups [37]. To determine
the scope of the intervention for promoting tolerance, we assessed
individuals’ commitment to democratic norms [38]. In addition,
with the view to maximizing the impact of the priming procedure,
we varied the number of category combinations participants were
required to generate. On the one hand, generating more
surprising category combinations allows for greater practice and
longer exposure to counter-stereotypic thought, and this would
argue for stronger effects with an increased number of category
combinations. On the other hand, generating more category
combinations implies greater effort, which could undermine the
benefits of the priming task through cognitive depletion, or by
reducing individuals’ confidence in their thought processes [39]. In
light of these conflicting predictions, we asked participants to
generate either five (easy) or ten (difficult) category combinations.
Tolerance by Surprise
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Method
Participants and design. Eighty-three British undergradu-
ates (53 females, Mage = 23.49) were randomly assigned to the
conditions of a 2 (combination type: counter-stereotypic vs.
stereotypic)62 (number of combinations: five vs. ten) factorial
design.
Procedure and materials. After having generated five (ten)
counter-stereotypic (stereotypic) category combinations, partici-
pants rated their attitudes towards different social outgroups:
elderly, disabled, HIV patients, asylum seekers, and gay men, using the
following bipolar adjective pairs separated by a 9-point scale:
warm-cold, negative-positive, friendly-hostile, suspicious-trusting, respect-
contempt, admiration-disgust (General Evaluation Scale) [37]. At the
end, participants indicated their Commitment to Democratic Norms [38]
(e.g., ‘‘Free speech should be provided for all no matter what their
views might be’’) using a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree;
7= strongly agree) [a= .71, M= 5.73, SD= .86].
Results and Discussion
A 2 (combination type: counter-stereotypic vs. stereotypic)62
(number of combinations: five vs. ten) MANOVA was computed
on the evaluation ratings for the five minority outgroups after
reverse coding of negative items. The analysis yielded a significant
interaction between combination type and number of combina-
tions, F(5, 74) = 2.34, p= .050, g2 = 0.05. Simple effects confirmed
that, in the five combinations condition, thinking counter-
stereotypically led to more favorable attitudes towards all the
outgroups (Ms= 6.42 vs. 5.79), F(5, 74) = 2.37, p= .047, d = 0.34. In
other words, thinking counter-stereotypically promoted general-
ized tolerance. No such effect was found in the ten combinations
condition (Ms= 6.16 vs. 6.36), F,1. Turning back to the omnibus
test, no other effects emerged, Fs,1.6 (see Table 1). A repeated
measures ANOVA with combination type and number of
combinations as between-subjects factors revealed that the effects
of the surprising categories priming did not differ between the five
target groups, F(4, 304) = 1.39, p= .235, e= .90.
A 2 (combination type: counter-stereotypic vs. stereotypic)62
(number of combinations: five vs. ten) ANOVA was conducted on
Commitment to Democratic Norms. The analysis yielded a
significant interaction, F(1, 77) = 4.31, p= .041, g2 = 0.05. Anal-
yses of simple effects revealed that after generating five counter-
stereotypic category combinations participants were more com-
mitted to democratic norms than after generating five stereotypic
category combinations (Ms= 6.06 vs. 5.44), F(1, 77) = 5.77,
p= .019, d = 0.54. No such effect was found when participants
generated ten combinations, (Ms= 5.63 vs. 5.79), F,1. No other
significant effects emerged.
As predicted the results showed that priming participants with
counter-stereotypic thinking led to more positive attitudes towards
a diverse range of outgroups and, notably, increased individuals’
commitment to democratic norms. No such effect was found when
participants generated ten category combinations. This suggests
that the benefit of counter-stereotypic over stereotypic thought
diminishes as individuals are compelled to generate a large
number of category combinations. Thus, although with the
current sample size generating a smaller number of counter-
stereotypic exemplars did not yield a significant difference from
generating many counter-stereotypic exemplars (p = .172), the
overall pattern of results supports the notion that generating a
lower versus higher number of combinations may be the optimal
strategy to achieve a generalized reduction in prejudice.
Experiment 5: Egalitarianism through Flexible
Thought
Experiments 1–3 demonstrated that counter-stereotypic think-
ing improves lateral thinking, lowers the need for cognitive closure
and helps overcome dominant associations. Experiment 4
provided the first evidence that these characteristics of the
hypothesized mindset result in generalized tolerance across
multiple outgroups. The aim of Experiment 5 was to demonstrate
more directly that generating counter-stereotypic category com-
binations encourages individuals to embrace diversity and to do
away with rigid preconceptions. To this end, we examined the
moderating role of Personal Need for Structure (PNS) [40]. If
generating counter-stereotypic category combinations increases
tolerance by compelling perceivers to push stereotypic thinking
aside, then individuals with a low need for structure should
respond best to the experimental procedure and exhibit a larger
increase in tolerance than individuals with a high need for
structure, who may be reluctant to do away with stereotypic
preconceptions. To test these predictions, we focused on another
facet of tolerance: endorsement of egalitarian values. For this
purpose we utilized Katz and Hass’s [41] Humanitarianism-
Egalitarianism scale, which measures peoples’ endorsement of
equality of opportunity, social justice, and concern for the well-
being of other individuals regardless of their respective group
membership. As in the previous experiment, we also asked
participants to generate either five or ten category combinations.
Method
Participants and design. Eighty British undergraduates (63
females, Mage = 20.85) participated in the experiment. The design
was identical to Experiment 4.
Procedure and materials. Upon arrival participants com-
pleted the Personal Need for Structure scale (PNS) [40] (e.g., ‘‘I don’t
like situations that are uncertain’’; 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly
agree; a= .78, M= 3.71, SD= .61) prior to generating five (ten)
counter-stereotypic (stereotypic) category combinations. Next,
participants completed the Humanitarian-Egalitarian scale [41]
Table 1. Attitudes towards different outgroups as a function
of combination type and number of combinations
(Experiment 4).
Category Combination
Stereotypic Counter-Stereotypic
Outgroup M SD M SD
Five Combinations
Elderly 6.64 1.34 7.11 1.43
Disabled 6.18 1.45 7.31 1.16
HIV patients 5.64 1.75 6.60 1.31
Asylum seekers 4.95 1.68 6.12 1.34
Gay men 6.55 1.52 6.79 1.71
Ten Combinations
Elderly 7.17 .81 6.84 1.07
Disabled 6.83 1.32 6.35 1.34
HIV patients 6.35 1.68 5.97 1.62
Asylum seekers 5.83 1.52 5.31 1.62
Gay men 6.33 1.93 6.33 1.73
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057106.t001
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(a= .87, M= 5.49, SD= .82), which measured participants’ egal-
itarian value orientations (e.g., ‘‘One should be kind to all people’’)
[1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree].
Results and Discussion
Given the findings from Experiment 4, we followed a
hypothesis-driven approach [42], [43], and employed a planned
contrast comparing the five counter-stereotypic category combi-
nations condition (coded 1) against the other three cells of the
design (coded 0). We regressed participants’ responses to the
Humanitarian-Egalitarian scale on the centred PNS scores, the
contrast coding, and the interaction of the two predictor variables
[44]. The analysis revealed a marginally significant main effect of
the condition contrast, b= .19, p= .080, qualified by a significant
interaction with PNS, b= –.28, p= .036. The lower individuals’
need for personal structure, the more participants benefited from
generating five counter-stereotypic category combinations in terms
of an increase in their egalitarian values. As can be seen in
Figure 1, thinking about five counter-stereotypic category combi-
nations changed the egalitarian attitudes of individuals with a low
(21SD: MS = 6.11 vs. 5.34), b= .41, p= .006, but not with a high
need for personal structure, (+1SD: MS = 5.39 vs. 5.44), b= –.02,
p= .878.
We also conducted an analysis using the General Linear Model
(GLM), where we added combination type and number of
combinations (both categorical) as well as PNS (continuous) as
predictors of Humanitarianism. Replicating Experiment 4, the
results revealed an interaction between combination type and
number of combinations, F(1, 72) = 4.79, p= .032, g2 = 0.06,
which upon closer examination was driven by a significant
difference between stereotypic and counter-stereotypic pairings
that only emerged for five category combinations, F(1, 36) = 6.10,
p= .018, g2 = 0.13, but did not emerge for ten category
combinations, F,1. However, this pattern also differed depending
on participants’ level of PNS. For those scoring low on PNS (21
SD), generating five counter-stereotypic category combinations
resulted in more egalitarian attitudes than generating five
stereotypic category combinations, F(1, 36) = 8.37, p= .006,
g2 = 0.17. In contrast, participants scoring high on PNS (+1 SD)
were unaffected, F,1. This pattern did not emerge for ten
category combinations, where participants’ level of PNS had no
effects (Fs,1). The overall outcome was a marginally significant
three-way interaction between combination type, number of
combinations, and PNS, F(1, 72) = 3.32, p= .072, g2 = 0.04.
These findings provide further evidence that thinking about a
few surprising, counter-stereotypic social category combinations
fosters a cognitive flexibility mindset that challenges established
knowledge structures. Furthermore, these results show that
thinking about counter-stereotypic exemplars can lead to greater
endorsement of egalitarian values. Changing people’s value
orientations is an important feat in the quest for generalized
reduction of prejudice and greater tolerance, since values are
higher order constructs that are more difficult to change and are
predictive of more specific attitudes [1], [41], [45], [46].
Experiment 6: Field Test
The aim of our final study was to test the viability of counter-
stereotypic priming in the field where real conflict defines
intergroup relations. The present experiment was conducted in
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and focused on
attitudes towards ethnic groups that shared a history of conflict.
The experiment utilized five category combinations only, which
had proved most successful in the laboratory. In this study we
aimed to replicate the generalized reduction of prejudice found in
Experiments 4 and 5, but this time with ethnic outgroups [37].
Furthermore, we aimed to extend the findings on generalized
reduction of prejudice by testing whether a counter-stereotypic
mindset can also lead to greater trust and willingness to reconcile
with the outgroup [47].
Method
Participants and design. Eighty-four volunteering ethnic
Macedonians (61 female, Mage = 23.92) were randomly allocated to
one of two experimental conditions (combination type: counter-
stereotypic vs. stereotypic).
Figure 1. Participants’ levels of generalized Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism, plotted as a function of participants’ personal need
for structure (PNS) and type of priming (high=1 SD above the mean, low=1 SD below the mean) [Experiment 5]. Lower scores indicate
lower egalitarianism.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057106.g001
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Procedure and materials. Participants were recruited from
workplaces and universities in the capital of Macedonia, Skopje.
Upon consenting to take part, participants were asked to generate
either five counter-stereotypic, or five stereotypic category
combinations. Participants then rated their attitudes toward four
different ethnic outgroups: Gypsies, Albanians, Greeks, and Serbs,
by using the following bipolar adjective pairs separated by a 7-
point scale: warm-cold, negative-positive, friendly-hostile, suspicious-
trusting, respect-contempt, admiration-disgust (General Evaluation Scale)
[37]. Participants also rated their generalized trust towards the ethnic
groups [47] (e.g., ‘‘Members of the ethnic minorities will exploit
me if I trust them’’ (R); 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree)
[a= .67, M= 2.62, SD= .88].
Results and Discussion
A MANOVA on attitudes towards the four outgroups yielded a
significant main effect, F(4, 78) = 6.60, p,.001, g2 = 0.09.
Participants who generated counter-stereotypic category combi-
nations displayed more positive attitudes towards the four ethnic
outgroups than participants who generated stereotypic category
combinations, (Ms= 4.05 vs. 3.72) [see Table 2]. A repeated
measures ANOVA with combination type as a between-subjects
factor confirmed that the effects of the counter-stereotypic priming
did not differ between the four target groups, F(3, 243) = 1.32,
p= .268, e= .921.
An Independent Samples t-test revealed that thinking about
surprising category combinations increased trust towards the four
ethnic outgroups, t(82) =23.61, p= .001, d = 0.80 (Ms= 2.93 vs.
2.28). These findings demonstrate that a cognitive flexibility
mindset induced by generating counter-stereotypic category
combinations can succeed in reducing prejudice and fostering
trust outside the laboratory in a context marked by a history of
ethnic conflict.
General Discussion
Philosophers, sociologists, politicians and policy-makers have
long struggled with the problem of prejudice, with the ultimate
aim of eradicating prejudice from human societies [48], [49], [50],
[51], [52]. The present research adds a new psychological
contribution to these efforts. We utilized principles of multiple
categorization to develop a new mindset induction approach to
reducing prejudice and promoting more positive intergroup
relations. Across six experiments, priming a counter-stereotypic
mindset increased cognitive flexibility, lowering the need for
cognitive closure (Experiment 1), increasing the inhibition of
dominant responses (Experiment 2), and heightening lateral
thinking (Experiment 3). Most importantly, priming counter-
stereotypic thinking lowered prejudice toward a multitude of
outgroups (Experiments 4 and 6), increased commitment to
democratic norms (Experiment 4), fostered egalitarian values
(Experiment 5), and enhanced trust towards outgroups in a setting
marked by a history of violent ethnic conflict (Experiment 6).
These findings underscore the potential of multiple categoriza-
tion as a tool to lower prejudice, and demonstrate for the first time
that multiple categorization based on surprising category combi-
nations can induce a mindset capable of lowering generalized
prejudice and increasing tolerance towards multiple outgroups.
Counter-stereotypic thinking reduced Stroop interference, point-
ing towards increased cognitive control and the inhibition of
automatic associations. Furthermore, priming counter-stereotypic
thinking reduced individuals’ need for cognitive closure and
improved their performance on lateral thinking tasks, suggesting
an epistemic motivation to process information deeper, and in
novel ways [53].
A remarkable finding is that the counter-stereotypic interven-
tion elicited heightened trust towards multiple ethnic outgroups in
a society marked by recent, visceral inter-ethnic hostilities.
Intergroup trust is acknowledged to be a fundamental deciding
factor whether two warring groups engage in reconciliation [54].
However, thus far research in this area has been very scant, mainly
arising from the difficulties of studying real conflicted groups.
From the few studies that have tested trust in intergroup conflict
we know that contact predicts trust positively, thus leading
researchers to propose that conflicted groups should be encour-
aged to come into contact more often [55]. However, one often
overlooked obstacle to establishing positive contact between
conflicted groups is the segregated nature of societies in conflict.
Contact cannot be forced, and even when it is established it
requires time for the positive benefits to occur. Therefore, there is
a need for simple interventions that would make people more
willing to reconcile with opponents. The present research provides
evidence for increased generalized trust after generating five
counter-stereotypic category combinations. Namely, thinking
about the diversity that defines modern societies leads to increases
in trust which in turn should lead to greater willingness to engage
in positive relations. Thinking about multiple categories could
provide a new, simple intervention technique to lay the grounds
for increased trust and reconciliation among conflicting parties.
The fact that the novel task we used does not include a specific
outgroup target may explain why it had more success than
previous interventions at promoting generalized tolerance. The
counter-stereotypic category combinations generated differed
widely between participants, and more importantly these combi-
nations differed from the multiple target outgroups that were used
as a measure of generalized prejudice reduction. These charac-
teristics of the novel task may explain the generalizability effect
found in our studies. The present research has therefore shown
that it is possible to affect variables that are resistant to change
such as values, personal beliefs, and attitudes by changing people’s
cognitive styles.
One question that arises is how the present findings can be
reconciled with past research that has shown that counter-
stereotypic exemplars are often assigned to a new category of
unrepresentative group members? This so-called subtyping process
enables people to maintain their pre-existing stereotypical beliefs
[56], [57], [58]. Closer inspection reveals important differences
between contexts that trigger subtyping and the present interven-
tion based on counter-stereotypic category combinations. In
particular, subtyping ensues in the presence of further, often
neutral information (e.g., an introverted lawyer working in a small or
big firm), but it tends not to occur when only category information
is available (e.g., an introverted lawyer) [59]. This suggests that the
absence of any additional person information might in fact be a
Table 2. Attitudes towards different ethnic outgroups as a
function of combination type (Experiment 6).
Stereotypic Counter-stereotypic
Outgroup M SD M SD
Gypsies 3.62 .64 3.89 .70
Albanians 3.71 .58 3.87 .62
Greeks 3.36 .54 3.87 .69
Serbs 4.20 .65 4.56 .45
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057106.t002
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critical feature of the success of the present mindset intervention.
Furthermore, thinking of more than one counter-stereotypic
exemplar could also counteract subtyping processes as categorical
knowledge becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile with the
counter-stereotypic exemplars. The fact that subtyping plagues
interventions targeted at the content of people’s stereotypes (i.e.,
what people think about others) underscores the need for
interventions targeted at people’s core cognition (i.e., how people
think about others).
From a practical, applied point of view the most valuable
contribution of the present research is the finding that a relatively
simple, short, and inexpensive task can foster tolerance and reduce
prejudice. The simplicity of the task makes it appealing and
manageable to implement by practitioners in real world settings,
where an ideal intervention should be quick, concise, and easy to
implement. With this in mind, it is encouraging that a brief task
appears to yield the most positive outcomes. The novel task can
also be used in highly segregated and antagonistic settings, thus
avoiding the pitfalls that previous interventions have suffered from.
A fully-fledged intervention programme may begin with the
novel task, and later when participants have adapted to resolving
inconsistencies arising from the counter-stereotypic challenging
diversity, practitioners may introduce a contact intervention
whereby people from opposing groups are brought together under
optimal conditions. In this case the novel task would make people
more open-minded and flexible, thereby decreasing the associated
anxiety and resistance that would impede the positive effects of
contact, paving the way for another more specific intervention to
work. For example, someone primed with a counter-stereotypic
mindset may, as a result of enhanced cognitive flexibility, engage
in more contact with their former enemy, or even join
superordinate category teams with outgroupers. A cognitive
flexibility mindset induction could thus be the first step in a
carefully designed intervention programme.
Future Research
One important aspect that future studies should test is the long-
term impact of this task. Previous research on self-regulation of
prejudice has shown that the motivation to avoid expressions of
negative stereotypes can lead to the automatic suppression of
stereotypes over time [60], [61], [62], [63]. This ability to self-
regulate stereotypes becomes easier with practice, which led Crisp
and Turner [23] to suggest that repeated engagement in resolving
stereotypic inconsistencies should improve the ability to suppress
existing stereotypes and engage in more generative systematic
thought. Importantly, as predicted by the CPAG model [23] the
temporary shifts in cognitive flexibility that ensue after thinking of
counter-stereotypic diversity should lead to chronic changes in
people’s cognitive style of thinking. Exploring the long-term
implications of chronic exposure to diversity is an important avenue
for future research. On a related note, it would also be interesting for
future research to explore whether asking participants to generate
non-social counter-stereotypic category combinations would pro-
duce different effects to the ones obtained with the social version of
the task. Another, related question pertains to the age at which
interventions based on cognitive mindsets would be maximally
effective. Using the task as part of personal and social education in
schools may lead to benefits for future intergroup relations.
One could suggest that the present findings are driven by an
increase in prejudice after asking participants to generate
stereotypic social category combinations. Generation of stereotypic
combinations was chosen as the most appropriate control task,
keeping all other factors constant apart from the key variable of
interest: stereotypicality of the generated combinations. What is
more, previous research has shown that stereotypic exemplars are
more easily accessible and typically guide individuals’ judgements
and behavior, thus exemplifying the default thinking mode [13],
[14], [15], [25], [26], [27]. Furthermore, in Experiment 3 we
utilized a baseline condition in which participants did not generate
any combinations prior to giving their answers on the dependent
measures. The data in this experiment demonstrated that the
effects on the dependent variable were driven by the counter-
stereotypic condition, whereas there were no significant differences
between the participants who generated stereotypic social category
combinations and those participants who were in the baseline
condition. These results coupled with previous theoretical and
empirical findings underscore the notion that counter-stereotypic
thinking can be a catalyst for improved intergroup attitudes.
The present studies also explored factors that strengthen or
weaken the outcomes of the mindset induction. The CPAG model
predicts that only those individuals who are motivated to engage in
the inconsistency resolution process that arises when being faced
with counter-stereotypically challenging diversity will show increases
in cognitive flexibility. Consistent with these conjectures, Experiment
5 showed that individuals who were high in personal need for
structure did not demonstrate reductions in generalized prejudice
after the task. Individuals with a high personal need for structure find
it harder to do away with established categories and pre-conceptions,
thus providing direct evidence for the importance of categorization
processes in the findings described here. Other, related individual
difference constructs such as the Need for Cognition (NFC) [64], [65],
[66], which describes an inclination for reflective thought, and
Ingroup Identification, which denotes the degree to which individuals
define or see themselves as group members [67], may have similar,
moderating effects. In practical terms, these findings are important
because they highlight the necessity for further research to develop
tasks that succeed in inducing a counter-stereotypic mindset in
people with a high personal need for structure.
As pointed out earlier in this paper, categorization is a useful
tool which saves cognitive resources and time. However, the
present research shows that categories may not be useful at all
times, and in fact there may be discernible benefits for intergroup
harmony if categories were sometimes not used at all. Therefore, it
would be interesting to examine the evolutionary trajectory of
categorization principles to determine the extent to which
categorization into in- and outgroups is a rudimentary function
from our evolutionary past, when instant categorization into
different groups may have engendered benefits for survival.
Evolutionary theories posit that the environment sometimes
changes faster than the ability of the organism to adapt, and the
result of this is that the organism finds itself mismatched to the
environment. Such an effect has been postulated for rudimentary
emotional responses, and may also apply to categorization
processes [68]. The mismatch hypothesis has also implications
for the social identification of individuals. Thus, even though
identification with social groups brings a host of benefits, such as
positive distinctiveness, the increasingly globalized and multicul-
tural world we are living in may mean that intergroup
differentiation is no longer a maximally viable method of
perceiving the social environment.
Conclusions
We have demonstrated that a generalized reduction of prejudice
can be achieved by instigating a counter-stereotypic mindset. This
work offers a possible answer to the question that has eluded social
psychologists for decades, namely how to foster tolerance and
reduce prejudice towards multiple outgroups. These findings have
important ramifications for future theorizing in the field of
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prejudice reduction. The fact that the novel task does not feature a
particular outgroup may explain why, in contrast to previous
interventions, we observed generalized tolerance. Furthermore, by
changing people’s cognitive styles the present research has shown
that it is possible to affect variables that are resistant to change
such as values, personal beliefs, and attitudes. The key to prejudice
reduction may therefore lie in changing peoples’ way of thinking,
rather than the content of their stereotypes.
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